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COMMON LAW THEORIES OF LIABILITY IN
DERIVATIVES LITIGATION
Aaron Rubinstein*
T HE last three years have seen an explosion of reported problems
with derivatives transactions and the number of litigations involv-
ing derivatives. Cases involving well-known financial institutions have
focused public attention on derivatives and questions surrounding
their various uses.
Statutes and industry rules have addressed a number of the
problems presented by derivatives, and no doubt new ones will be
promulgated; however, entities are looking to the common law for an-
swers and are charting new territory in the process. Somewhat sur-
prisingly, most of the key legal questions about derivatives remain
unanswered. I will discuss the common law theories of derivatives lia-
bility that are evolving from my vantage point as a practitioner and
the two issues most commonly litigated in the new derivatives arena-
authorization and suitability.
I. AN OVERVIEW OF THE PROBLEM
A good way to briefly overview the problems with derivatives is to
describe some of the more notable derivatives cases that have been
brought.
A. The Bankers Trust Cases
In the fall of 1994, two companies filed separate suits against Bank-
ers Trust seeking to avoid their derivatives losses and compensation
for past losses.
1. The Gibson Greetings, Inc. Case
Bankers Trust was sued by Gibson Greetings, a relatively small
company which, as its name suggests, was primarily a greeting card
manufacturer. In 1991, Gibson issued $50 million in long-term fixed
interest rate debentures. It alleged that in an effort to minimize its
interest expenses, it entered into several interest rate swap transac-
tions with the bank. Actually, there were 29 such transactions.
Gibson claimed that the bank misrepresented the periodic valua-
tions of the swaps and led it to invest in extremely volatile and risky
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swaps. In its harshest claim, Gibson maintained that, with losses from
one of its swaps astronomically increasing daily, the bank forced Gib-
son to enter into another swap to cap its losses, knowing that the fu-
ture of the company was at stake. Gibson claimed it had no
independent way to evaluate this new transaction, and that the bank
gave it only hours to decide whether or not to enter into the deal. The
bank's response was to generally deny the allegations. It attempted to
portray Gibson as a large and sophisticated company, which was able
to understand the nature of the investments. On November 23, 1994,
the parties announced that they had settled the dispute. Gibson
agreed to pay the bank approximately $6 million, or roughly 30% of
what the bank claimed it was owed. Thus, the legal community was
denied the opportunity to see this matter decided in court.
2. The Procter & Gamble Case
Procter & Gamble, one of the largest and seemingly most sophisti-
cated American companies, sued the bank over an interest rate and a
currency swap seeking to recover nearly $200 million in compensatory
damages, along with punitive damages. Procter & Gamble asserted a
wide range of theories under statutory and common law. Most nota-
bly, it claimed that the bank misled it as to the terms of the transac-
tions. Procter & Gamble asserted that it had specific and limited
purposes for doing the swaps, that the bank knew that, and that it did
not want to undertake trades that had substantial downside risks. It
then asserted that it could not itself fully understand the nature of the
trades the bank proposed and that it relied on the bank to determine
that the trades met Procter & Gamble's goals and criteria. Procter &
Gamble, one of the largest U.S. conglomerates, was saying that, with
all its Harvard MBAs, it did not understand what it was investing mil-
lions of dollars in.
It also claimed that the bank intentionally misled it on the transac-
tions. This led to claims that the bank defrauded Procter & Gamble
and that the bank, as a fiduciary, breached its duty to Procter & Gam-
ble. Not surprisingly, the bank stressed Procter & Gamble's financial
sophistication and the suitability of the derivative products to Procter
& Gamble's investment goals and strategies. It denied any fiduciary
relationship and that it ever misled Procter & Gamble.
In May, 1996, the parties settled with Procter & Gamble receiving
approximately $100 million of the $200 million it sought. This settle-
ment-maybe not coincidentally-came after a highly publicized dis-
pute wherein Business Week printed quotes from tapes of telephone
conversations made by the bank's employees. Those tapes made a big
splash in the media and Procter & Gamble argued that the tapes
showed that the bank was guilty of lying, cheating, and stealing from
its clients.
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Something that has gone somewhat unnoticed is that just prior to
the settlement, the district court in Ohio entered an opinion which
was, in many respects, the first attempt to chart the waters of the rela-
tionship between a broker and a customer in the derivatives market-
place under U.S. law.' At the outset, though, it is important to
understand that this case was somewhat atypical. There is a wide
spectrum of aggrieved customers that could bring suits and Procter &
Gamble was on one end of that spectrum, the proverbial widows and
orphans being on the other end. The bank was being sued by Procter
& Gamble, one of the largest corporations in the US-certainly an
entity which most people would consider to be quite sophisticated.
On a motion by the bank, the court had to determine several issues of
first impression.
The court addressed what duties and obligations existed between
the parties. Focusing on the fact that they were counter parties, the
court applied New York law and found that the bank had not under-
taken a fiduciary duty to Procter & Gamble. On this issue, the Court
was somewhat conclusory and did not really explain its decision, other
than to cite to some New York cases finding no fiduciary duty in nor-
mal arms length business relationships among companies. 2 Signifi-
cantly, the court did not review any contentions that the bank was
advising Procter & Gamble, and simply pronounced that the two com-
panies were contracting at arms-length.
Even if the bank and Procter & Gamble truly were contracting at
arms-length, it is apparent that many derivatives users are not. They
repose trust in sellers to advise them and act in the company's best
interest. The Procter & Gamble decision does not answer the ques-
tion of whether a fiduciary duty arises in those situations. Again,
there is a spectrum, and all the Procter & Gamble decision tells us is
"not at this end." The Procter & Gamble decision is, therefore, fact
specific. A fiduciary relationship can exist, but did not under the facts
of that case.
But the court did find that the bank could be liable to Procter &
Gamble if certain facts could be proved. The court found that the
bank had a duty of good faith and fair dealing inherent in every con-
tract and, under New York law, had a duty to disclose information
during the negotiation and performance of the transactions because it
had superior knowledge.'
1. Procter & Gamble Co. v. Bankers Trust Co., 925 F. Supp. 1270 (S.D. Ohio
1996).
2. Id. at 1289-90.
3. Id. at 1290.
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B. Orange County
It has been widely publicized that Orange County, California filed
for bankruptcy after experiencing a multi-billion dollar loss in its in-
vestment fund. Primarily through Merrill Lynch, Orange County in-
vested billions of dollars in "inverse floaters," which were largely
financed by "reverse repose." Orange County has sued Merrill Lynch
over these transactions, asserting that its derivatives transactions are
null and void. It seeks additional damages of $2 billion. Orange
County claims that its derivatives transactions violated certain provi-
sions of the California Constitution and related state laws regarding
municipal finance. These provisions make the transactions unauthor-
ized because Orange County did not have the ability to enter into
them as it claims Merrill Lynch knew. In addition, it asserts claims of
breach of fiduciary duty and common law and statutory fraud similar
to what we saw in the bank cases. The litigation between Orange
County and Merrill lynch is ongoing. The case has yet to yield any
real jurisprudence on suitability or authorization.
C. The Lehman vs. Minmetals Case
That brings me to the case that I am in the midst of now, the Leh-
man v. Minmetals case. It is a good example of the type of case that
involves both of the primary issues of authorization and suitability.
Much of what is alleged and involved is a matter of public record, and
I am limited in what I can discuss to that public information.
In November, 1994, Lehman Brothers filed suit against two Chinese
companies, seeking to recover derivatives trading losses which Leh-
man says those companies incurred. From the time the complaint was
filed, Lehman portrayed its suit as a case involving a simple contract
dispute, and a case of Chinese companies being unwilling to pay their
debts. The Minmetals companies counter-attacked. They focused on
two items: derivatives and the inequality between the seller and cus-
tomer relating to experience, knowledge, and sophistication. This ine-
quality affects the duties and obligations of the seller. The Minmetals
case will test those duties in the context of a large U.S. financial insti-
tution dealing with a foreign company which had no prior experience
in these types of transactions; a company which, like many foreign
companies doing such transactions, was just entering the stream of
complex international financial transactions.
Specifically, Minmetals asserted its claims based on the facts that
the transactions: 1) were made with an unauthorized employee; 2)
were illegal under Chinese law; and 3) were subject to statutory and
common law fraud claims, breach of fiduciary duty and negligence.
Two of these issues will be my focus today; namely, authorization of
employees to engage in derivatives transactions, and the suitability of
those transactions even if the employee was authorized.
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From these cases-and the well publicized Barings situation-it is
easy to see that there are three characteristics that are most likely to
cause a problem: disputed losses are most common when the deriva-
tive products being traded are complex, where the investor has lever-
aged itself to make the deal, and where the sheer size of the
investment is too large for the particular investor. Thus, two lines of
defense are emerging-authorization and suitability.
II. AUTHORIZATION
Some customers are claiming that the employees who entered into
derivatives transactions on their behalf never had the requisite corpo-
rate authority to do so. They point to a lack of due diligence on the
part of the seller in investigating whether the person with whom they
dealt could act for the corporation. This claim involves the assertion
that the employee was somehow a renegade and the corporation was
unaware of what was actually being done. This is grounded in com-
mon law agency doctrine.
There are three types of authorization: 1) express authority; 2) im-
plied authority; and 3) apparent authority. A party must show that
one of these three types of authority existed to bind a principal to the
acts of its agent. Express and implied authority are rarely present-
although sellers would be well advised now to get express authority as
a condition before allowing trading.
A. Apparent Authority
Apparent authority is where the action is. Where there is evidence
that shows that an agent acted with apparent authority, a principal
may be bound, even though both express and implied authority are
lacking. Apparent authority is authority which the principal either
knowingly permits its agent to exercise or otherwise represents that
the agent wields. It does not turn on the agent's actions. The agent's
representations to a third party are not relevant. The key to a factual
inquiry into apparent authority is the principal. Liability is imposed
because the actions of a principal or an employer give the false im-
pression that authority exists.
Two elements of apparent authority must be proven: 1) a showing
that the principal somehow acted in a way that could be construed as
consenting to the exercise of authority; and 2) a showing that the party
asserting apparent authority was aware of the principal's actions and
had a reasonable basis for concluding that the agent possessed the
requisite authority based on the principal's conduct.
Practically, the key focus of the inquiry will be the reasonableness
of the seller's reliance. Asking whether a party had a duty to inquire
into an agent's apparent authority is another way of asking whether
the third party reasonably relied on the representations of the agent.
1997]
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A third party's duty to inquire into an agent's apparent authority
arises when: 1) the facts and circumstances are such as to put the third
party on inquiry; 2) the transaction is extraordinary; or 3) the novelty
of the transaction alerts the third party to a danger of fraud or im-
proper conduct. Unusual or novel transactions (like many derivatives
contracts) may be deemed to put a party on notice. Similarly, transac-
tions which are inconsistent with the needs of the company or investor
can give rise to a duty of inquiry.
Authorization was not an issue in Gibson Greetings, but the facts
offer an example of how it could have been. When a relatively small
greeting card company is undertaking large complex investments to
fundamentally change the financing of its debt-29 such transactions
in a short period of time-one can see how the seller might be on
notice to question the apparent authority of the person it was dealing
with.
B. Illegality
A related attack on derivatives transactions has been to claim that
the entire transaction was illegal and therefore void. While a defense
in its own right, an illegality claim can support an assertion that the
transactions were not authorized, and in fact could not be authorized.
Minmetals' claim of illegality is illustrative.
Minmetals maintains that China places strict limits on foreign cur-
rency trading and speculative investments, and because the govern-
ment did not authorize it to enter into those types of transactions, it is
not responsible for them. Even if a customer cannot avoid the conse-
quences of trading because the trades were illegal, customers that are
challenging the employee's authorization assert that the seller knew or
should have known that the trade violated the law and, if so, the seller
could not have reasonably believed that the employee had the author-
ity to do something that was illegal. This type of claim has so far been
untested in the derivatives litigation arena.
The courts will have to decide whether sellers have a duty to deter-
mine if transactions are legal. But, even if the law will not impose
such a duty on a seller, the seller may not be off the hook if it, in fact,
knew about legal restrictions on the trading. For example, investment
banks doing offerings and prospectuses in a foreign country often
themselves elaborately disclose that the country has restrictions on
foreign currency transactions. Such a seller will likely have a hard
time avoiding an illegality defense-or at least asserting a reasonable
reliance on apparent authority argument-by claiming it had no obli-
gation to investigate the law.
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III. SUITABILITY
Authorization requires understanding and comprehension of the
product. It thereby ties into suitability, which is the other central issue
raised in these litigations. My earlier point on the legal relationship
between customers and sellers is largely a debate about who bears the
responsibility for determining whether derivatives transactions are
suitable for the individual customer. Because derivatives are often
such complex and highly leveraged products, they intensify the suita-
bility question.
For derivatives, there is no clear rule as to suitability. Litigants
have pointed to different standards of care, seeking to apply them to
derivatives. These standards have not been extensively tested in the
courts. As I previously discussed, a court in Ohio was unwilling to
relieve Procter & Gamble of an independent duty to determine suita-
bility for itself. Who would it relieve of such a duty?
Suitability assertions manifest themselves in two primary claims: 1)
breach of fiduciary duty; and 2) fraud. The battle over the legal rela-
tionship between the buyer and seller often focuses on the term "fidu-
ciary." While customers maintain that the seller was a fiduciary, the
sellers maintain that legally they are no more than a counter-party to
an arms-length derivatives contract. Indeed, on some level, they are
both correct. It is often the case that the seller performs a dual role in
derivatives trading. On the one hand, it advises the customer and, as
customers have alleged, is engendered with the customer's utmost
trust and confidence. On the other hand, the seller is often the
counter-party to the derivatives contract and, thus, the seller alleges
that the transaction was negotiated at arms length.
Current litigation will have to resolve this inherent conflict in flesh-
ing out exactly what the duties of the seller are in these dual roles.
The Procter & Gamble case was a start. The court found that as a
large and sophisticated company, Procter & Gamble was truly at
arm's length with the bank. However, there will still be much litiga-
tion on the dual role as it applies to smaller and less savvy entities.
Do not assume that suitability applies only to demystifying complex
transactions, for even simple transactions can be unsuitable if they are
used in great quantities. Barings was not brought down by horribly
complicated swaps; it was done in by relatively simple transactions-
but billions and billions of dollars of them. Litigation vill also have to
answer this question: When does a customer understand the transac-
tion, but in completing an inappropriately large volume of transac-
tions, and thereby undertaking a very large risk, what duties, if any,
does the seller have?
Under a fiduciary duty theory, the customer asserts that, as a fiduci-
ary, the seller had the responsibility to determine that the product
sold was inappropriate and unsuitable for the customer. This can be
1997]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
the result of the size, risk, and leverage of the product, a lack of rela-
tionship to the customer's core business or the customer's legitimate
business needs, or simply because the product did not accomplish
what the customer was trying to accomplish. The better equipped the
customer is to make that determination for itself, the less likely it is
that a fiduciary relationship will be created. Such a relationship is
often the result of an imbalance of knowledge, ability, sophistication,
and the like. The greater the imbalance, the greater the chance that a
fiduciary relationship exists.
That brings us to fraud claims. Customers have alleged fraud in
many forms. They assert traditional common law fraud, as well as
fraud under the anti-fraud provisions contained in state and federal
securities and commodities laws. In general, a customer must show
that a seller made a false statement, with a wilful or reckless intent to
deceive which was material and reasonably relied on by the customer.
Customers have asserted that sellers have committed fraud in nearly
all aspects of their dealings, from misrepresenting the nature and risks
of the derivatives, to misrepresenting the value of the derivatives after
execution.
Obviously, affirmative misrepresentations made on the subjects
such as volatility, risk, and pricing can potentially create traditional
fraud claims; there is nothing new about that. But even without af-
firmative misrepresentations, traditional fraud claims can arise from
unsuitable investments. When a seller advises a customer to do a spe-
cific transaction-or even suggests it do it-there is an implicit repre-
sentation that the investment is suitable. That is not to say that it is a
sure bet, but rather that it is not something that is inappropriate for
the customer. The issue becomes what obligations does the seller
have to investigate the appropriateness? Can it base the recommen-
dation on what little it knows about the customer, or is it obligated to
expand its lack of knowledge to satisfy itself that it is appropriate?
Often, these products are customized. The customer comes to the
seller and says, "This is what I need to accomplish, can you design or
sell me something to do that?" If the seller comes back with a prod-
uct, it essentially is saying, "This is what you want." That is similar to
an affirmative misrepresentation.
Arguably, when a company is on the brink of doing highly complex
investments which are outside its core business competency, there is
an obligation on the part of the seller to investigate suitability to en-
sure that the derivatives are not inappropriate. And if it does not, but
says go ahead and do this trade, depending on how it says it-espe-
cially how enthusiastically it says it-it may be acting fraudulently.
CONCLUSION
In sum, there are thousands of different types of derivatives transac-
tions, each of which is very different from the others. In that context,
[Vol. 66
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there is a much stronger case for imposing heightened obligations on
the professionals. Put simply, many derivatives users seek advice
from professionals because while the deals can be very beneficial for
the customer, wading through the maze of different derivative prod-
ucts is too daunting to be done alone. In those situations, where the
professional recommends what is inappropriate, somehow a claim is
likely to exist.
Notes & Observations
